Strategic Trade Policy and Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly

フォーマット:

論文

責任表示:

Fang Wei

言語:

英語

出版情報:

北九州市立大学経済学会, 2012-12

著者名:

Fang Wei  

掲載情報:

北九州市立大学商経論集 = The Review of business and economics

ISSN:

13472623      

巻:

48

通号:

1・2

開始ページ:

1

終了ページ:

25

概要:

This paper incorporates the separation of ownership and management as well as import tariff policy into an international mixed duopoly model in which a home semipublic firm competes with a foreign private firm. We demonstrate three cases to examine how the presence of separation of ownership and management affects the home government’s tariff imposition incentive when a home firm is partially nationalized. We further examine how the move advantage of the home … government and firm owners affects their payoffs. It is shown that the home government and home firm prefer to acting as the first mover, while the foreign firm does not always. The ranking of the optimal tariff rates in the three cases (no delegation, government moves first, owners move first) is dependent on the degree of nationalization of the home semipublic firm. 続きを見る

URL:

http://id.nii.ac.jp/1077/00000300/