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1.

論文

論文
Fang Wei
出版情報: 北九州市立大学商経論集 = The Review of business and economics.  48  pp.1-25,  2012-12.  北九州市立大学経済学会
URL: http://id.nii.ac.jp/1077/00000300/
概要: This paper incorporates the separation of ownership and management as well as import tariff policy into an international mixed duopoly model in which a home semipublic firm competes with a foreign private firm. We demonstrate three cases to examine how the presence of separation of ownership and management affects the home government’s tariff imposition incentive when a home firm is partially nationalized. We further examine how the move advantage of the home government and firm owners affects their payoffs. It is shown that the home government and home firm prefer to acting as the first mover, while the foreign firm does not always. The ranking of the optimal tariff rates in the three cases (no delegation, government moves first, owners move first) is dependent on the degree of nationalization of the home semipublic firm. 続きを見る
2.

論文

論文
FANG WEI
出版情報: 北九州市立大学商経論集 = The Review of business and economics.  49  pp.79-92,  2013-12.  北九州市立大学経済学会
URL: http://id.nii.ac.jp/1077/00000345/
概要: This note studies how the foreign ownership affects the host government's trade policy. We examine the four cases to examine the government's strategic policy determination. When the country owns a part of the equities of the foreign firm, the government has the incentive to tax borh domestic and foreign firms. Since taxation makes firms compete less aggressively and increase tax revenues, taxing both domestic and foreign firms improves the national welfare. We also show the numerical results under linear demand function and examine how the trade policy and market equilibrium are affected by the foreign ownership and cost efficiency. 続きを見る
3.

論文

論文
魏, 芳
出版情報: 北九州市立大学商経論集.  56  pp.49-62,  2021-03.  北九州市立大学経済学会
URL: http://id.nii.ac.jp/1077/00000728/
概要: In this note, we reexamine the implications of the separation of ownership and management based on relative performance contracts following the Miller and Pazgal(2005). We show that the strategic subsidization incentive depends on the presence of managerial delegation. We further endogenize the firms' managerial delegation decisions and find that both firms choose not to delegate a manager, and the socially optimum outcome is the result. 続きを見る