A Note on Strategic Delegation and Trade Policy with Relative Performance

フォーマット:

論文

責任表示:

魏, 芳

言語:

英語

出版情報:

北九州市立大学経済学会, 2021-03

著者名:

魏, 芳  

掲載情報:

北九州市立大学商経論集

ISSN:

13472623      

巻:

56

通号:

1・2・3・4合併号

開始ページ:

49

終了ページ:

62

バージョン:

none

概要:

In this note, we reexamine the implications of the separation of ownership and management based on relative performance contracts following the Miller and Pazgal(2005). We show that the strategic subsidization incentive depends on the presence of managerial delegation. We further endogenize the firms' managerial delegation decisions and find that both firms choose not to delegate a manager, and the socially optimum outcome is the result.

URL:

http://id.nii.ac.jp/1077/00000728/